Imagine sending a mechanic into space to fix your satellite. Sounds like science fiction, right? Well, it’s happening now. Companies are building spacecraft that can dock with other satellites to refuel them, repair broken parts, or even de-orbit dead ones to clear up space junk. This is called on-orbit servicing, or OOS. But here’s the catch: while engineers have figured out how to fly these missions, lawyers and policymakers are still scratching their heads over who owns what, who pays if things go wrong, and whether one country has the right to touch another country’s satellite.

We’re standing at a crossroads. The technology for rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) is ready, but the legal framework is stuck in the past. If we don’t sort this out, the future of commercial spaceflight could be grounded by lawsuits, security fears, and regulatory gridlock. Let’s break down the messy reality of space law today.

The Old Rules Don’t Fit the New Game

To understand why OOS is such a headache for lawyers, you first need to look at where our current rules come from. Most international space law rests on five United Nations treaties adopted between 1967 and 1979. The big one is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. These documents were written when space was mostly about flags, footprints, and radio signals. No one back then imagined private companies flying service vehicles to tinker with each other’s hardware in low Earth orbit.

The problem? These treaties don’t mention on-orbit servicing explicitly. They talk about general principles like state responsibility and avoiding harmful interference. Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty says states are responsible for national activities in space, including those done by private companies. Article VII and the 1972 Liability Convention say states are liable for damage caused by their space objects. Article IX requires countries to avoid causing harmful interference to others.

That sounds fine until you realize "harmful interference" isn’t clearly defined for close-proximity maneuvers. Does hovering near a satellite count as interference? What if a servicing vehicle accidentally bumps into a third-party satellite? The old treaties give us broad strokes but no detailed brushwork for the complex dance of RPO missions.

Who Owns That Satellite?

Ownership and consent are the biggest sticking points. Under the 1975 Registration Convention, every space object is registered by a single state. That state retains jurisdiction and control over the object. So, if a U.S.-registered servicing spacecraft wants to approach a French-registered communications satellite, does the U.S. company need permission from France? From the French operator? Both?

Yumiko Takatori, a leading voice in recent space law analysis, highlights this dilemma. She asks fundamental questions: Whose permission must be obtained to approach a satellite? Who bears responsibility if an accident occurs? Currently, there is no standard protocol. Most experts agree that bilateral contracts between the servicing provider and the satellite owner are essential. These contracts need to reflect obligations under the Outer Space Treaty and clarify that the target owner consents to the approach.

Without clear consent mechanisms, every RPO mission risks being seen as an unauthorized intrusion-or worse, a hostile act. In a crowded orbital environment, ambiguity is dangerous. Operators need certainty that they won’t be sued or sanctioned for simply doing their job.

The Liability Nightmare

Let’s say a servicing mission goes wrong. Maybe the robotic arm jams, or the thrusters fire unexpectedly, creating a cloud of debris that hits another satellite. Who is liable? The servicing company? The satellite owner who hired them? The launching state of the servicer? The launching state of the victim?

This is where the law gets fuzzy. The 1972 Liability Convention establishes absolute liability for damage caused on Earth or to aircraft in flight, and fault-based liability for damage in space. But defining "fault" in a close-proximity operation involving two moving objects is incredibly difficult. Did the servicer make a navigation error? Did the target satellite drift unexpectedly? Was the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) data inaccurate?

ESPI Report 76, published in 2022, identifies liability uncertainty as a major barrier to investment. Insurers are hesitant to cover OOS missions because the risk models are unproven. Without clear rules on fault allocation, operators face an additional layer of financial risk. Newman and colleagues argue that robust domestic authorization regimes and comprehensive insurance frameworks are necessary precursors to commercial deployment. Until then, many potential clients will stick to traditional launch-and-forget models rather than risk a costly lawsuit.

Filling the Gaps: Standards and Self-Regulation

Since new global treaties take decades to negotiate, the industry is turning to standards and soft law to fill the vacuum. Two key players here are ISO 24330:2022 and CONFERS.

ISO 24330:2022, published on July 1, 2022, is a landmark document. It’s titled "Space systems - Rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) and on-orbit servicing (OOS) - Programmatic principles." While it’s a voluntary technical standard, not a law, it sets best practices for mission planning, risk assessment, safety margins, and data exchange. Think of it as a checklist for safe behavior. Companies that follow ISO 24330 can demonstrate due diligence if something goes wrong, which helps with liability and licensing.

Then there’s CONFERS (Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations). This group includes major aerospace players like Boeing, Airbus, and Northrop Grumman. Their guiding principles emphasize that operations must be consensual, conducted via commercial agreements, and compliant with all national regulations and the Outer Space Treaty. CONFERS essentially operationalizes treaty obligations into practical norms for business. It tells regulators: "If you let us play by these rules, you can trust us to be safe and transparent."

The Dual-Use Dilemma

Here’s the elephant in the room: the same technology used to gently dock with a satellite for repairs can also be used to disable or capture it. A robotic arm that fixes a solar panel could just as easily rip it off. Thrusters that adjust orbit could push a satellite out of position.

Newman’s 2019 analysis warns that OOS technologies present a major challenge for international law because they could be weaponized. This dual-use nature creates deep security concerns. States may be reluctant to allow foreign servicing vehicles near their strategic assets, fearing espionage or sabotage. As a result, transparency becomes crucial. Operators need to prove their intentions are benign. Confidence-building measures, such as sharing SSA data and publishing mission plans, help alleviate these fears.

Export controls add another layer of complexity. High-tech components used in RPO missions often fall under strict export regulations. Navigating these rules requires careful coordination between industry and government agencies. If a servicing company violates export laws, the consequences can be severe, ranging from fines to loss of license.

National Regulatory Patchworks

While international law provides the baseline, national laws dictate the details. And here, the picture is fragmented. In the United States, for example, on-orbit activities are subject to a patchwork of regulations under multiple agencies. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Department of Commerce all have overlapping authorities. This confusion frustrates industry players who want clear guidelines.

A 2025 policy paper noted that U.S. laws do not explicitly address commercial on-orbit servicing, and Congress has not specifically authorized agencies to create OOS-specific regulations. The recommendation? Enable regulatory authority to provide clarity for licensing, safety, and liability. Similar calls for tailored national regimes are coming from Europe and Australia. Bond University researchers stress the need for clear standards for technical safety, SSA data use, and mission transparency.

In short, if you want to launch an OOS mission, you need to navigate a maze of local laws, export controls, and security reviews. Getting it wrong means delays, costs, or cancellation. Getting it right requires multidisciplinary teams combining legal expertise, engineering skills, and policy knowledge.

What Comes Next?

The path forward isn’t about scrapping the old treaties. It’s about adapting them. Experts like Christopher Newman advocate a pragmatic approach: interpret existing treaties to cover servicing, develop detailed national authorization regimes, and rely on technical standards like ISO 24330 and industry codes like CONFERS. We don’t need a new global treaty immediately; we need better implementation of what we have.

For the industry, this means investing in legal infrastructure. Contracts need to be tighter. Insurance products need to evolve. Transparency needs to increase. For policymakers, it means updating national laws to recognize OOS as a distinct activity with unique risks. Clearer rules will attract investment, spur innovation, and keep our orbits sustainable.

On-orbit servicing is essential for the future of space. It extends satellite lifetimes, reduces launch costs, and cleans up debris. But its success depends on solving the legal and policy puzzles today. If we get it right, we’ll see a thriving ecosystem of service providers keeping space clean and functional. If we get it wrong, we’ll face collisions, conflicts, and stagnation. The choice is ours.